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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Covert E. Parnell, III

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: March 28, 1972

No. 70-220 Caplin v. Marine Midland
Prior to the Conference on Friday, I would appreciate your
taking a look at Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act and at the Trust
Indenture Act of 1940.
At oral argument, counsel for Marine Midland Bank asserted
categorically that there is not a word in Chapter X which authorizes
a trustee to sue on claims - not of the Debtor but of third parties who
have claims against the Debtor.
Counsel also asserted that the debenture holders were expressly
authorized to sue the debenture trustee by provisions of the Trust
sq

Indenture Act of

19f/J.

My own recollection is in accord with the latter statement,
and my guess is that the former statement also is correct. But please
take a look before Friday.
L.F.P., Jr.

lfp/ss lee 3/28/72

..
No. 70-220 CAPLIN v. MARINE MIDLAND
Argued 3/28/72
Tentative Impressions*
This case involves a question of "standing". Caplan, trustee
under Chapter X of the bankrupt Webb and Knapp, Inc., brought suit
against Marine Midland Bank (the Bank) seeking to recover the face
amount of $4, 200, 000 of debentures issued by the Debtor.
The Bank was trustee under the debenture agreement, which
contained a covenant requiring a specified ratio of assets to liabilities.
The Debtor was required when creating additional debt or buying
additional real estate, to file affidavits with the trustee showing
compliance with this covenant. The facts indicate that these affidavits
were erroneous, and Caplan claims in this suit that the Bank was
either grossly negligent or wilfully dishonest.
Three suits have been instituted - one in a federal court - by
holders of the debentures.

Although discovery depositions have been

taken in one of these cases, they have been held in abeyance pending
the outcome of this case.
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read,
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion
at the Conference.

2.
Caplan does not assert an exclusive right to sue, and concedes
that these other suits by debenture holders may be maintained. He
takes the position, however, that he is in the best position - being
trustee of the Debtor - to know of the facts, and that he should be
allowed to sue. He agrees that any recovery made will be turned over
to the debenture holders.
Counsel for Caplan asserts four reasons why trustee has
authority to sue:

1. The general scheme of the federal statutes. He refers
to the Chandler Act, the Trust Indenture Act and other SEC legislation which are said to "focus in the trustee" authority to take all action
on behalf of all creditors.
2.

Specific statutory authority.

He refers to

§

587 -which

vests in the trustee all of the powers of an equity receiver, as giving
him the right.
3. Trustee is best informed. This is a pragmatic argument,
based on possession of all facts and information.
4. The Clark case, relied on by the Section Circuit, is said
to be plainly wrong.
Counsel for Marine Midland (Mr. Dickey) had the better of the
argument.

Some of his principal points were:

3.
1. Caplan's suit asserts no claim under the Trust Indenture
Act or under any other federal act. In essence, it is a negligence
suit -which could have been brought under state common law -alleging
negligence and misconduct by a trustee.
As contrasted with this, the debenture holders are expressly
authorized to sue the trustee by provisions of the Trust Indenture Act.
Caplan cannot bring a class action on behalf of all debenture
h olders, as he is not a member of the class.
Mr. Dickey asserted flatly that there is not a word in Chapter
X which authorizes the trustee to bring a suit on behalf - not of the
debtor corporation - but of a creditor of the debtor (namely, a bondholder).
There is no showing that this suit facilitates the reorganization
of the Debtor. Indeed, a plan or reorganization has been approved by
the SEC and is now under consideration by the district court. It allows
only a fractional recovery by these debenture holders (3% I believe),
which means that they have a right - if they can prove their case - to
recover 97% of the face amount of their bonds from the Bank.
It is pointed out that if the Debtor's trustee has standing and
the right to sue (which admittedly is not exclusively), there will be
a multiplicity of suits. Question of priority between the suits will

4.
arise; questions of comity as between state and federal courts may
exist; and problems involving class actions may also exist.
My Tentative Conclusion:
I would affirm Judge Friendly's opinion.

-.

3/30/72

CEP

MEMORANDUM
Rea

Your Memo of 3/28/72 concerning No, 70 .. 220, Caplin Y.•
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co,

(1)

Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
The representation of counsel for Marine Midland that

Chapter X does not specifically authorize the trustee to
sue indenture trustees on claims of the holders of the
indenture securities is of course correct,

Were there

such specific statutory authorization this case would not
be here,

The trustee finds his standing or authority in

three places, two of which are significant&
(a)

The trustee finds explicit statutory authority

in Section 187 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USC 587, which
provides a
Where not inconsistent with the provi·
sions of this chapter, a trustee , , ,
if authorized by the judge, shall have
and may exercise such additional rights
and powers as a receiver in equity would
have if appointed by a court of the
United States for the property of the
debtor,
The trustee contends that McCandless Y.• Furland, 296
US 140 (1935), establishes that equity receivers
have standing to sue third parties on behalf of

bondholders.
(b)

The trustee also finds a right to sue in

the fairly broad policy of _implied,'_ rights of action
in order to effectuate the public policies under•
lying the federal securities laws.

Cf. J.I.Case Co.

y. Borak, 377 US 426, 433 (1964),

(2)

The Trust Indenture Act of 1939
I have .!!Q!;_ been able to locate a provision in the

Trust Indenture Act which expressly authorizes holders
of indenture securities to sue the indenture trustee,
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April 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I will in due course circulate a dissent
in No. 70-220 - Caplan v. Marine Midland Grace
·Trust.

,~LY
w.lyn.

4/10/72
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Cert to CA 2
Re:

~d: ~ ...

1st draft of TM's Opinion for the
Court

TM's opinion seems to deal with the issues wellp and
I find myself generally in agreement with it.

WOD has

indicated, however, that he will in due course circulate a
dissent.

Since this is a rather confusing case, I suggest

that you await WOD's dissent before joining anyone.

CEP

To: The Chief Jus tl c e
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
:Mr .
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE

Just i ce Do uglas
Jus"Uc e Bcr.,:;nan
Just~.ce

From: Marshall , J .

UNITE:6 1ST1\~=_,.tt~fi_~:.h_.,__
Recirculated:

No. 70-220
Mortimer M. Caplin, etc.,
Petitioner,
On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the SecThe Marine Midland Grace
ond
Circuit.
Trust Company of
New York.
[April -, 1972]
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, the
trustee in reorganization of Webb & Knapp, Inc. , has
standing under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52
Stat. 883, 11 U. S. C. § 501 et seq., to assert, on behalf
of persons holding debentures issued by Webb & Knapp,
claims of misconduct by an indenture trustee. The
United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that petitioner lacked the requisite
standing, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed en bane, with two judges dissenting, 439 F. 2d 118 (1971). 1 We granted certiorari, U. S. ( 1971), and we now affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The District Court delivered three separate opinions in thi~ ca~c.
They are unreported, but arc included in the appendix prepared by
the parties at pp. 58a-70a. The Court of Appeals heard the case
en bane after a panel of three judges determined that it was inclined
to overrule the case on which the District Court had placed almost
exclusive reliance. 439 F. 2d, at 118.
1

S ~.,e ~',ar t

J us·i;.i.ce rr. •.:_te
J usti c e }.J"l rlC l:mun
J usti c e Powe ll~
Justice Eelm q_uis

-------
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I

Webb & Knapp and its numerous subsidiaries were
engaged in various real estate activities in both the
United States and Canada. In 1954, the corporation
executed an indenture 'vith respondent, the Marine Midland Trust Company of Now York ("Marine"), that provided for the issuance by Webb & Knapp of 5o/o debentures in the total amount of $8,607,500. A critical part
of the indenture was tho promise by Webb & Knapp
that neither it nor any company affiliated with it" would
incur or assume "any indebtedness resulting from money
borrowed or from the purchase of any real property or
interests in real property . . . or purchase any real
property or interests in real property" unless tho company's consolidated tangible assets, as defined in the
indenture, equaled 200/'0 of certain liabilities, after giving effect to the contemplated indebtedness or purchase.'l
By requiring the company to maintain an asset-liability
ratio of 2:1, the indenture sought to protect debenture
purchasers by provicli11g a cushion against any losses
that tho company might suffer in the ordinary course
of business. In order to demonstrate continuing compliance with the requiremeuts of the indenture, Webb
& Knapp covenanted to file an annual certificate with
Marine stating whether tho corporation (debtor) had
defaulted on any of its responsibilities under tho indenture during the proceeding year. 1
2 Those companies in the affiliated group include nny corporation
that. \Yas entitled to be included in n comolidated tnx return of Wrbb
& Knapp. Sec 26 U. S. C. § 1502. Section 1.1 of the Indenture
gave Webb & Knapp authority to consider other compnnirs ns
nffiliatcs if it chose to do so.
:J Indenture of June 1, 1954, Webb & Knapp, Inc. to The Mnrine
Midland Trust Company of New York § 3.6 (hereinafter refrrrcd·
to as Indenture).
4
Indenture§ 3.11.

70-220-0PINIO N
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I

In its role as indenture trustee, Marine undertook "in
case of default ... to exercise such of the rights and
po,Yers vested in it by [the] Indenture, and to use the
same degree of care and skill in their exercise, as a
prudent man would exercise or use under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs."" This under-~
taking was qualified by language in the indenture which
permitted the trustee to rely on the accuracy of certificates or reports of Webb & Knapp, in the absence of bad
faith.c
Commencing in 1959, Webb & Knapp sustained substantial financial losses in every year. 7 Finally, on May
7, 1965, Marine filed a petition in district court seeking
the involuntary reorganization of Webb & Knapp under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcuy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 501
et seq. Pursuant to § 208 of Chapter X, 11 U. S. C.
§ 608, the Securities and Exchange Commission intervened on May 10, 1965.R Marine's petition was sub- (
sequently approved and petitioner was appointed trustee
in reorganization on May 18, 1965.
With the approval of the District Court, petitioner
exercised the powers conferred upon him by 11 U. S. C.
§ 567 and undertook an extensive investigation of the
financial affairs of \Yebb & Knapp. His investigation
5

Indenture § lO.la. This wns also a statutory duty. See 15
U. S. C. § 77ooo.
G Indenture§ 10.1 (d).
1
Webb & Knapp showed a loss for tax purposes earh year, nlthough the compnny did show a gnin on its books for 1961 attributable to a write-up of property owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary of a company in whieh Webb & Knapp held 50% of the
stock.
s The SEC has supported petitioner throughout this litigation.
The agency is "an unnamed respondent before this Court." See
Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U. S. 414, 420 n. 3 (1968).
'Vhen referring to arguments made by petitioner, this opinion assumes, unless otherwise stated, that the SEC has made the same
arguments.

70-220-0PINION
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showed that the company had total assets of $21,538,621
and total liabilities of $60.036,164, plus contingent tax
liabilities of $29,400,000. Included among the liabilities
were the 1954 debentures in the principal amount of
$4,298,200 plus i11terest subsequent to the inception of
the reorganization proceeding. 0
The investigation led petitioner to conclude that Marine
had either wilfully or negligently failed to fulfill its
obligations under the indenture. Petitioner supported
his conclusion with the following allegations: that from
1954 to 1964, Webb & Knapp's yearly certificates of
compliance with the 2:1 asset-liabiiity raho mandated
by the indenture were fraudulent, because they were
based on grossly overvalued appraisals of real estate
property; that from 19.58 to 1964, Webb & Knapp did
not have sufficient assets to comply with the terms of the
indenture; that Marine should have known or did know
of the inflated appraisals; and that because Marine permitted Webb & Knapp to violate the indenture by engaging in transactions which its impaired asset-liability
ratio forbid, Webb & Knapp suffered great financial
losses. 10
Having obtained the approval of the District Court,
petitioner filed an independent action on behalf of the
debenture holders against Marine seeking to recover the
principal amount of the outstanding debentures as damages for Marine's alleged bad faith failure to compel
compliance with the terms of the indenture by Webb &
Knapp. Petitioner also filed a counterclaim in the same

-

0 The difference between thi · nmount and the amount of the debentures originally issued represents the amount of the principal
which Webb & Knapp had repaid.
10 These are merely allegations of petitioner, not findings of the
lower courts. Because the Di::;trict Court and the Court of Appeals
held that petitioner had no standing, they had no occnsion to consider the validity of the allegations.

\

l

J
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amount against Marine in the reorganization proceeding
in which Marine had previously filed a claim for services
rendered. In the reorganization proceeding, petitioner
also filed an objection to the claim for services rendered
on the ground that even if petitioner could not obtain an
affirmative recovery against Marine on behalf of the
bondholders, he could at least raise Marine's bad faith
conduct as a reason why the claim for services rendered
should be denied. u Finally, petitioner moved to compel
an accounting by Marine.
Marine moved to dismiss the independent action and
the counterclaim, moved to strike the objection to the
claim for services rendered, and opposed the motion to
compel an accounting. The District Court found that
petitioner had no standing in his capacity as a trustee in
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
to raise claims of misconduct by an indenture trustee on
behalf of debenture holders and granted both of Marine's
motions to dismiss. Viewing the motion to compel on
accounting as merely a third vehicle to raise the same
claim on behalf of the debenture holders, the District
Court denied that motion also. Only petitioner's objection to the claim for services rendered was left standing. 1 2
Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his claims and the
denial of his motion for an accounting to the Court of
In its capacity as indenture trustee, Marine also filed a claim
on behalf of all the debenture holders for the unpaid principal on
the debentures.
1 2 This objection differs from the other claims in one respect:
i. e., it is an attempt to preserve the remaining aosets of the debtor
for all cr editor~ other than Marin e, whereas the other claiml:i represent an attempt by the petitioner to increase the assets of the debtor
for the benefit of a specific class of creditors, the debenture holders.
Although Marine appealed the ruling of the District Court denying
its motion to strike the objection, it did not seek review here of the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the District Court on
this issue. This issue is, therefore, not before us, and we offer no.
opinion on the propriety of the lower courts' ruling.
11

70-220-0PINION
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Appeals. Marine filed a cross-appeal from the denial of
its motion to strike petitioner's objection to the claim
for services rendered. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the derision of the District Court in its entirety.
II

The issue confronting us has never before been pre- }
sented to this Court. It is an issue that has only rarely
been presented to other courts, and on those rare occasions, it has caused even the most able jurists to disagree.
The first time the issue arose was in Clar·he v. Chase National Bank, 137 F. 2d 797 (CA2 1943). Judge Augustus
Hand wrote the opinion of the court holding that a
trustee in reorganization did not have standing to suo
a third party on behalf of bondholders. Judge Learned
Hand disagreed and dissented. It is this decision that
the lower courts found controlling in the instant case. ~
The Clarke rase is, in fact, the only other case in which
the issue that is raised here is squarely presented.' ~ The
issue is a difficult one, and as we point out later, it is
one that is capable of resolution by explicit congressional

-

13

Petitioner and the two dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals
argue thnt the issue wn~ presented in Prudence-Bonds Corp. v. State
Street Trust Co., 202 F. 2d 555 (CA2) , cert. denied, 346 U. S. 835
(1953), nnd that the decision of the court in that rase by Judge
Learned Hand overruled Clarke v. Chase National Bank, supra, sub
silentio. They also argue that the issue wns presented and decided
contrary to Clarke in In re Solar Manufacturing Corp., 200 F. 2d
327 (CA3 1952), cert. denied, sub nom. Marine Midland Trust Co.
v. McGirl, 345 U. S. 940 (1953). But, the majority of the Court
of Appenls found these en~es to be distinguishnble, and Marine urges
that the majority was correct. We do not intend to become enmeshed in this eontroYCrsy and merely indicate its existence to
demonstrate thnt not only is there a di1·ision of opinion among
lower courts on the issue, but there is also a split of opinion nmong
able judges on the manner in which the lower courts diYide.

70-220-0PINION
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action. Lacking a specific legislative statement on this
issue, ''"e must resolve it as best we can by examining the
nature of Chapter X proceedings, the role of the trustee
in reorganization, and the way in ''"hich standing to sue
on behalf of debenture holders would affect or change
that role.
Chapter X, enacted in 1938, stemmed from a comprehensive SEC study that disclosed widespread abuses under
the then existing provisions for business reorganizations.
Sec Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the
Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel, and Functions of Protective and Reorganization
Committees ( 1937-1940). This same study gave birth
the following year to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
53 Stat. 1149, 15 U. S. C. ~ 77aaa, which is discussed
infra.
In enacting Chapter X, Congress had protection of
public investors primarily in mind. SEC v. American
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U. S. 594 (1965). "The aims
of Chapter X ... "·ere to afford greater protection to
creditors and stockholders by providing greater judicial
control over the entire proceedings and impartial and
expert administrative assistance in corporate reorganizations through appointment of a disinterested trustee and
the active participation of the SEC." !d., at 604. In
contradistinction to a bankruptcy proceeding where liquidation of a corporation and distribution of its assets is
the goal, a Chapter X proceeding is for purposes of rehabilitating the corporation and reorganizing it. Ibid.
Chapter X proceedings are not limited to insolvent
corporations but arc open to those corporations that are
solvent in the bankruptcy (asset-liability) sense but are
unable to meet their obligations as they mature. United
States Y. Key, 307 U. S. 322, 329 (1970); 11 U. S. C.
~ 530 ( 1).

'

.
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The trustee in reorganization is the center of the statutory scheme. H. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
43, 44. 11 U. S. C. § 567 gives the trustee broad powers:
"The trustee upon his appointment and qualification"(1) shall. if the judge shall so direct, forthwith
investigate the acts, conduct, property, liabilities,
and financial condition of the debtor, the operation
of its business and the desirability of the continuance thereof, and any other matter relevant to the
proceeding or to the formulation of a plan, and
report thereon to the judge;
"(2) may, if the judge shall so direct, examine the
directors and officers of the debtor and any other
witnesses concerning the foregoiug matters or any
of them;
"(3) shall report to the judge any facts ascertained by him pertaining to fraud , misconduct, mismanagement and irregularities, and to any causes
of action available to the estate;
" ( 5) shall. at the earliest date practicable, prepare and submit a brief statement of his investiga..:
tion of the property, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of its business and
the desirability of the continuance thereof, in such
form and manner as the judge may direct, to the
creditors, stockholders, indenture trustees, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and such other
persons as the judge may designate; and
"(6) shall give notice to the creditors and stockholders that they may submit to him suggestions
for the formulation of a plan, or proposals in the
form of plans, vvithin a time therein named."
11 U. S. C. § 587 expands these powers:
"Where 11ot inconsistent with the provisions of
this chapter, a trustee, upon his appointment and

'

.

70-220-0PINION
CAPLIN v. MARINE MIDLAND GRACE TRUST CO.

9

qualification, shall be vested with the same rights,
be subject to the same duties, and exercise the same
powers as a trustee appointed under section 72 of
this title, and, if authorized by the judge, shall havo
and may exercise such additional rights and powers
as a receiver in equity would have if appointed by
a court of the United States for the property of the
debtor."
The powers given a trustee appointed under ~ 72 are set
forth in a footnote.'• Petitioner argues that these powers
are broad enough to encompass a suit on behalf of de11 11 U. S. C. § 110 gives the trustee title to the following·
"property":
"(a) The Trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor
or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification,
shall in tum be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a
proceeding under this Act . . . to all of the following kinds of
property wherever located ( 1) documents relating to his property;
(2) interests in patents, patent rights, copyrights, and trade-marks,
and in applications therefor ... (3) powers which he might have·
exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might have
exercised solely for some other person; (4) property transferred by
him in fraud of his creditors; (5) property, including rights of
action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial proceRs against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered ... (6) rights of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or detention of or injury
to his property; (7) contingent remainders, executory devises and
limitations, rights of entry for condition broken, rights or possibilities of reverter, and like interests in real property, which were nonassignable prior to bankruptcy and which, within six months thereafter, become assignable interests or estates or give ri~e to powers·
in the bankrupt to acquire assignable interests or estates; and
(8) property held by an assignee for the benefit of creditors appointed under an assignment which constituted an act of bankruptcy, which properly shall, for the purpose~ of this Act, be deemed\
to be held by the assignee as the agent of the bankrupt and shall
be subject to the summary jurisdiction of the court."

70-220-0PINION
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bcnture holders against an indenture trustee who has
acted in bad faith, and who has, therefore, violated the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U. S. C. § 77aaa.
As pointed out above, the Trust Indenture Act was
passed one year after Chapter X was enacted. Prior to
its enactment, investment trustees immunii'-cd themselves
from any liability for either deliberate or negligent misconduct by writing exculpatory provisions into the indenture. Even in cases where misconduct by the indenture trustee was the proximate cause of injury to
debenture holders, they found themselves impotent under
the terms of most indentures to take action against the
trustee. See generally 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 719725 (2d ed. 1961). This problem a.nd others arc specifically mentioned in 15 U. S. C. § 77bbb as establi~hing
a necessity for regulation.
The regulation provided by the Act takes many forms.
15 U. S. C. § 77cce requires that '"hencvcr securities covered by the Trust Indenture Act are also covered by the
registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1033, 48
Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. ~ 77a, certain infonnation about the
indenture trustee and the terms of the indenture must
be included in the registration statement. 15 U. S. C.
~ 77ggg provides that when securities are not registered
under the 1933 Act but are covered by the Trust Indenture Act, the indenture must be "qualified" by the
~EC before it is legal to sell the securities. Standards for
eligibility and disqualification of a trustee are established by 15 U. S. C. § 77jjj, and the duties and responsibilities of a trustee arc enumerated in 15 U. S. C.
§ 77ooo. 1 "'
"' The SEC is given general supervisory powers over indentures
in ,·:uious sections of the Trust Indenture Art. Sec, e. g., 15
U.S. C. §§77ddd(c), (d), (c); 7iccc(n), (c); 77ggg; 77ss~; 77ttt;
77uuu. In addition, 15 U. S. C. § 77hhh prO\· ides that the SEC
may order consolidation of reports or certfiicatcs filed under the
1
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The indenture giving rise to this · igation was qualified by the SRC pursuant to the T ust Indenture Act of
1930. By alleging that the ind nture trustee acted in
bad faith in failing to prevent ebb & Knapp from violating the terms of the inclet ure, petitioner clearly alleges a violation of the 19 9 legislation, 15 U. S. C.
~ 77ooo."' But, the questi 1 remains whether petitioner
is a proper party to take orrective action."
Petitioner urgrs that e reorganization trustee is in
a far better position
t debt investors to discover and
to prosecute claims based on the alleged failure of an
indenture trustee to live up to the provisions of the indenture. He points to 11 U. S. C. ~ 567, set forth infra,
and emphasizes that not only does the reorganization
trustee have possession of the records of the debtor, but
he also has a statutory duty to investigate the debtor's
affairs and to "report to the judge any facts ascerta·
by him pertaining to fraud, misconduct, misma
ement
and irregularities, and to any causes of a · n available
to the estate." Reference is made
to 15 U. S. C.
Trust Indenture Act with information or documents filed under the
Seruritie~ Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq., and
the Srruritie;; Exch:111ge Art of 193-t, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. § 78a
et seq., the Public Utility Holding Compan~' Art of 193.5, -l-9 Stat.
838, 15 U.S. C.§ 79 et seq.
1 r. The provisions of the indenture discussed preYiously comply
with the requirements of 15 U. S. C. § 77ooo. While the indenture
trustee is not permitted by the statute to exculpate himRdf from
liability for acts done or omitted in bad faith, the indenture tru tee
may rely in good faith on certificates or reports filed pursuant to
the indenture and in compliance with the provisions thereof.
17 We assume arguendo that violation of 15 U. S. C. § 77ooo would
give rise to a cau~e of action against an indenture trustee by debenture holders. If there is a cause of action, 15 U. S. C. § 77vvv
would seem to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. The court
of appeals inferred that such suits would be proper, 439 F. 2d, at
123 n. 5, but did not decide the point. Since we conclude that even
if such suits may be brought, petitioner lacks standing to bring them,
we do not decide the issue.
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§ 77bbb (a)(l) which states that one of the problems

Congress saw with respect to misconduct by indenture
trustees was that "(A) individual action by . .. investors for the purpose of protecting and enforcing their
rights is rendered impracticable by reason of the disproportionate expense of taking such action, and (B) concerted action by such investors in their common interest
through representation of their own selection is impeded
by reason of the wide dispersion of such investors through
many States, and by reason of the fact that information
as to the names and addresses of such investors generally
is not available to such investors." 18
Finally, petitioner asserts that to give him standing
to sue on behalf of debenture holders will not encourage
vexatious litigation nor unduly deplete the resources of
the debtor which he has been appointed to reorganize.
He supports the first half of this proposition by noting
that any action he takes is subject to the supervision
of the District Court and to intervention by the SEC.
The second half of the proposition finds support in the
argument discussed above that petitioner already has a
duty of investigation and that the minimal additional
burden of prosecuting a lawsuit will not be great.
At first blush petitioner's theory, adopted in the opinion of the dissenters in the Court of Appeals, seems reasonable. But, there are three problems with petitioner's
18 It should be noted that the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 was
enacted on August 3, 1939. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were not even two year,; old, having been adopted by this Court
on December 20, 1937. The class action was a comparatively recent phenomenon with respect to damage actions and its was not
tremendously helpful in the early days. See, e. g., Moore, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary
Draft, 25 Geo. L. J. 551, 570-576 (1937); Kalven & Rosenfield,
The Contemporary Functions of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev,
684 (1941). It could not be said that the class action was an ef~
ficacious remedy in 1939.

~

'
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argument and these problems requires that his position
be rejected.
F~t, Congress has established an elaborate system
of controls with respect to indenture trustees and reorganization proceedings, and nmvhere in the statutory
scheme is there any suggestion that the trustee in reorganization is to assume the responsibility of suing third
parties on behalf of debenture holders. The language, \
in fact, indicates that Congress had no such intent in
mind. The statute, 15 U. S. C. § 567 (3), gives the
trustee the right, and indeed the duty, to investigate
fraud and misconduct and to report to the judge the
potential causes of action "available to the estate."
Even assuming that this section is read as if the quoted
words were not present, and that it authorizes a trustee
in reorganization to report whether he believes an indenture trustee has violated a duty to third-party debenture holders, there is nothing in the section that
enables him to collect money not owed to the estate.
Nor is there anything in 11 U. S.C. § 110, set fortl'iin
full in footnote 13, supra, that gives him this authority.
His task is simply "to collect and reduce to money the
property of the estates for which [he is trustee]." 11
U.S. C.§ 75.
The only support petitioner finds in the relevant statutes is in that portion of 11 U. S. C. § 587 which gives
reorganization trustees the additional rights that a "receiver in equity would have if appointed by a court of
the United States for the property of the debtor." Petitioner relies on McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U. S. 140.
( 1935) , to support the proposition that a receiver in
equity may sue third parties on behalf of bondholders.
But, the opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Cardozo
clearly emphasizes that the receiver in that case was
suing on behalf of the corporation, not third parties; he
was simply stating the same claim that the corporation
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could have made had it brought suit prior to entering
receivership.l!' The debtor corporation makes no such
claim in this case. Sec generally 3 Clark, Receivers§ 362,
at 619 (3d eel. 1959).
This brings us to the second problem with petitioner's
argument. Nowhere docs petitioner argue that Webb
& Knapp could make any claim against Marine. Indeed,.
the conspicuous silence on this point is a tacit admission
that no such claim could be made. ~" Assuming that all
of petitioner's allegations of misconduct on the part of
the indenture trustee arc true, petitioner has at most
described a situation "·here Webb & Knapp and Marine
were in pari delicto. Whatever damage the debenture
holders suffered, under petitioner's theory Webb & Knapp
is as much at fault as Marine, if not more so. A question would arise, therefore, " ·hethcr Marine would be
entitled to be subrogated to the claims of the debenture
holders. The Court of Appeals thought that subrogation
would be required, 439 F. 2d, at 122.
If the Court of Appeals is correct, it is then difficult
to see \Yhat advantage there is in giving petitioner
n This point is especially clear in light of the fact that the Court
5-4 on whether Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn, 210
U.S. 206 (1908) (Holmes, J.), was binding in McCandless v. Furlaud. The issue in the contro,·er~ial Old Dominion case was whether
a corporation had a cause of action against promoter-directorstockholders.
20 If petitioner could ~uc on behalf of Webb & Knapp, the statute
that requires that he report pos~ible cause~ of action to the court
would require mention of thi,; cause of action. 1\'Ioreo\'er, petitioner ha s brought e,·ery comeivable claim that is a,·ailable to him
as trustee. Not only has he brought these actions on behalf of the
indenture trustees, but he has also sued former officer· of Webb &
Kapp charging them with waste. Brief for SEC 5-6. Certain settlemcnts have apparently been made in some of these other actions.
Brirf for Rc8pondcnt 45 11. lR
1

~plit
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standing to sue. for as Chief Judge Friendly noted in his
opinion for the court below:
'·It is necessary in the first instance to consider
what effect a recovery by the Chapter X Trustee
" ·ould have on the reorganization. On a superficial
view this might seen1. substantial-if, for example,
the Chapter X Trustee were to achieve a complete
recovery, the debenture holders would be paid off
and it might seem that there \vould be that much
more for the other creditors and the stockholders.
But this pleasant pmspect speedily evaporates when
the law of subrogation is brought into play. As a
result of subrogation, Marine would simply be substituted for the debenture holders as the claimant.
Cf. ALI, Restatement of Security § 141 (1941). If
the Chapter X Trustee recovered judgment in a
lesser amount, the claim of the debenture holders
would still be provable in full, with the division of
the proceeds between them and Marine dependent
upon the results of the reorganization, and other
creditors or stockholders "·ould not be affected."
430 F. 2d, at 122.
Even if the Court of Appeals is incorrect in its view of
the propriety of subrogation under the facts of this case,
the fact remains that in every reorganization there is
going to be a question of how 111uch the trustee in reorganization should be permitted to recover on behalf
of the debenture holders. The answer is, of course,
whatc,·cr he cannot recoup from the corporation. Once
this is recognized, the wisdom of Judge Augustus Hand
in Clarke v. Chase 1\/ational Bank, 137 F. 2d, at 800, becomes readily apparent:
"Each creditor, including the debenture-holders,
can prove the full11mount of his claim, and only to
'-

l
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the extent that a debenture-holder fails to satisfy
it from the bankruptcy estate will he suffer a loss
from which he can assert through the defendant
through its failure to enforce the negative covenants."
In other \vorcls debenture holders '""ill not be able to recover damages from the indenture trustee until the reorganization is far enough along so that a reasonable
approximation can be made as to the extent of their
losses, if any. It is ditlicult to see precisely why it is
at that point that the trustee in reorganization should
represent the interests of the debenture holders, who are
capable of deciding for themselves whether or not it is
"·orthwhile to seek to recoup whatever losses they may
have suffered by an action against the indenture trustee.
Petitioner appears to concede that any suit by debenture
holders would not affect the interests of other parties to
the reorganization assuming that the Court of Appeals
is correct on the subrogation point. It would seem,
therefore, that the debenture holders, the persons truly
affected by the suit against Marine, should make their
own assessment of the respected advantages and disadvantages not only of litigation, but of various theories
of litigation.
This brings us to the third problem with petitioner's
argument: i. e., a suit by him on behalf of debenture
holders may be inconsistent with any independent actions
that they might bring themselves. Petitioner and the
SEC make very plain their position that a suit by the
trustee in reorganization Q.Qes not preempt suits by individual debenture holders. They maintai'i1;however,
that it would be unlikely that such suits would be brought
since the debenture holders could reasonably expect that
the trustee would vigorously prosecute the claims of all
debt investors. But, independent actions are still likely
because it is extremely doubtful that the trustee and all
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debenture-holders would agree on the amount of damages
to seek or even on the theory on which to sue. 21 Moreover, if the indenture trustee "vins the suit brought by
the trustee in reorganization, unless the debenture holders
are bound by that victory, the proliferation of litigation
that petitioner seeks to avoid would then ensue. 22 Finally, a question would arise as to who was bound by any
settlement. 23
Three private nctions hnve been brought by debenture holders
Marine, one in federal court and two in slate court. See
Brief for Petitioner 21 n. 9. These suits make the same claims made
by the petitioner in the instant case, as well as others which he
has not made, including alleged violations of the securities laws.
22 The trustee may well have interests that differ from tho ·e of
the bondholdrrs. For example, petitioner has sued not only Marine,
but also the former officers of Webb & Knapp. In settling the
suits brought ngainst the officers, petitioner may well take positions:
that conflict with those he would take in a suit against Marine.
The conflict may at times be unfavorable to the debenture holders.
One answer obviously is that the District Court and the SEC can
take action to prevent any such conflict from developing, e. g., by
denying the trustee in reorganization the right to sue on behalf of
debenture holders in selected cases. The problem with this answer
is that the conflict may not appear until the suit is well underway.
In such a case the debenture holders might regret placing their
confidence in the trustee.
23 Chapter X, 11 U. S. C. § 616 (2), provides that a plan for
reorganization "may deal with all or any part of the property of
the debtor." It also provides that the plan "may include provisions'
for the settlement or adjustment of claims belonging to the debtor
or to the estate." 11 U.S. C.§ 616 (13). Despite these provisions,
petitioner urges that he can settle a suit on behalf of bondholders
without binding them to the settlrment. But, as pointed out in the
text, supra, petitioner only has authority to pursue claims belonging to estate. Petitioner is thus caught on the horns of a dilemma;
either he is incorrect in asserting that the statutory definition of
duties should be read so broadly as to allow a trustee in reorg:mization to treat claims by debenture holders against third parties as
sufficiently relrtted to the estates that the trustee may sue on behalf
of the debenture holders; or he is correct, and § 616 would appear
21

again~t
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Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for class actions, avoids some of these
difficulties. It is surely a powerful remedy and one that
is available to all debenture holders.~ Some of the
factors that formerly deterred such actions have been
changed by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. 15 U.S. C.
~ 77lll, for example, now requires that the debtor corporation maintain lists of debenture holders which it
must turn over to the indenture trustees at regular intervals. Such lists are available to the individual debenture holders upon request. Debenture holders would
also be able to take advantage of any information obtained by the trustee in reorganization as a result of the
investigation which the statute requires that he make.
In addition, petitioner himself maintains that counsel
fees '"oulcl be recoverable if the action was successful.
Brief for Petitioner 20; cf. 1.5 U. S. C. § 77nnn.
Thus, there is no showing whatever that by giving peti- '\~
tioner standing to sue on behalf of the debenture holders J\
4

to permit him to bind the debenture holders to u settlement. Even
if petitioner ran have it both wa~rs, his inability to bind the pcrl:lons
on whose brha lf he sues undercuts the utility of his suing. Because
i he debenture holders could bring a class action and bind all members of i he class, they can make a binding settlement and avoid
lengthy and expensive litigation. Petitioner cannot make such a
settlement. Moreover, if a reorganization trustee docs settle a suit
that he has brought on behalf of debenture holders, he may find
that rather than serving as their representative, he is forced to
oppose their interests when they bring independent actions to recover more than the settlement figure. In this event, the reorganization trustee would be forced to justify his settlement, and he would
theoretically join the indenture trustee in opposing the action of
the debenture holders. He would find himself on both sides of the
same transaction.
21
Again we assume arguendo that the Trust Indenture Act gives
a right of action to debenture holders under these circumstances,
Ob,·iously, if the debenture holders themseh·es have no cause of
art ion, their surrogate is in no bet tcr position.
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we would reduce litigation. On the contrary, there is
every indication that litigation would be increased, or at
least complicated.
III
For the reasons discussed above we conclude that petitioner does not have standing to sue an indenture
trustee on behalf of debenture holders. This does not
mean that it would be unwise to confer such standing
on trustees in reorganization. It simply signifies that
Congress has not yet indicated even a scintilla of an intention to do so, and that such a policy decision must
be left to Congress and not to the judiciary.
Congress might well decide that reorganizations have
not fared badly in the 34 years since Chapter X was
enacted and that the status quQ.Js preferable to inviting
new problems by making changes in the system. Or,
Congress could determine that the trustee in a reorganization was so well situated for bringing suits against indenture trustees that he should be permitted to do so.
In this event, Congress might also determine that the
trustee's action was exclusive, or that it should be brought
as a class action on behalf of all debenture holders, or
perhaps even that the debenture holders should have the
option of suing on their own or having the trustee sue on
their behalf. Any number of alternatives are available.
Congress would also be able to answer questions regarding subrogation or timing of law suits before these questions arise in the context of litigation. Whatever the
decision, it is one that only Congress can make.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting.
With all respect, today's decision reflects a misunderstanding of the important role which a reorganization
trustee under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U. S. C. § 567, is supposed to perform. Prior to Chapter X the debtor had usually remained in possession; and
Chapter X effected a basic change in putting a disinterested trustee in charge. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 43- 44. Working under the direction
of the Court, the reorganization trustee was to make the
necessary investigations concerning the debtor, the operation of its business, and the desirability of its continuance
"and any other matter relevant to the proceeding or to
the formulation of a plan, and report thereon to the
judge." 11 U. S. C. § 567 (emphasis added). The reorganization trustee is, indeed, charged by 11 U. S. C.
§ 569 with the responsibility of formulating a plan?
11 U . S. C . § 5G9 provides:
" Where a trustee has b een a ppoint ed th e judge shall fix :t tim e·
within which the trustee shall prepare and fil e a plan , or a report
of his reasonR why a pla n cannot b e eff ect ed, a nd ~hall fix a
subsequ ent time for a hea ring on such pla n or report a nd for the
consideration of an y obj rction ~ which m ay b e m ade or of such
nmenclments or plnns as may b e proposed by th e debtor or by
any creditor or stockholder ."
1

,
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A Chapter X plan docs not look forward to a discharge of the debtor as does ordinary bankruptcy, but
rather to an overhaul of its capital structure, a simplification of it, if need be. and the determination of the
fair share which each class of old creditors shall receive
and \vhat participation, if any, the old stockholders may
be granted. The test \vhich the Court must ultimately
apply under Chapter X is whether a plan is "fair and
equitable, and feasible. " 11 U. S. C. § 574. The test
of "fair aud equitable" derives from the old equity reCC'iverships which was adopted in former § 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act (all as we discussed in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106), and which
was adopted as the test of a reorganization plan under
Chapter X. As stated in the House Report "the [reorganization l trustee is required to assemble the salient
facts necessary for a determination of the fairness and
equity of a plan of reorganization." H . R. Rep. No.
1409, 75th Cong., 1st Se.:s., 43.
The requirements of "fair and equitable," which the
Court must apply, entail the application of the absolute
priority rule which we discussed at length in Los Angeles
Lumber Products and which "·as followed in Co11solidat ed Rock Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510, under § 77B
of the Bankruptcy Act. It not only gives creditors full
priority over stockholders, but protects senior classes of
creditors against the claim that "junior interests \Yere
improperly permitted to participate in a plan or were
too liberally treated therein." 308 U. S., at 118. Unsecured creditors need not be paid in cash as a condition
to stockholders retaining an interest in the reorganized
company, for they may be protected by the issuance "on
C'quitable terms of income bonds or preferred stock."
!d., at 117.
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And as we said in the DuBois case:
"If the creditors are adequately compensated for
the loss of their prior claims, it is not material out
of ·what assets they are paid. So long as they receive full compensatory treatment and so long as each
group shares in the securities of the whole enterprise on an equitable basis, the requirements of 'fair
and equitable' are satisfied." 312 U. S., at 530.
The fare amount of the debentures in litigation here
was $4.298,200. The damages sought against the indenture trustee arc in the same amount. If we assume,
arguendo, that there is merit in the cause of action and
that the indenture trustee is fully responsible, one entire
cla s of security holders is eliminated from any necessary
consideration in the plan. Or if there is only partial
recovery, there is a pro rata change in the relative positions of the various classes of creditors. A plan cannot
be designed without a final determination of the status
of the debenture holders vis-a-vis the indenture trustee
or at least an informed judgment concerning the value
of that claim.
It is said that the assets of the debtor were some $21
million and the liabilities some $00 million. Whether
conditions have changed so as to leave some equity for
the old stockholders, we do not know. The rule announced by the Court today, however, is Hot for this case
alone but applicable to all reorganizations under Chapter
X. In some cases the elimination of one entire class
of creditors or a pro rata reduction in their claims would
give stockholders a chance to participate in the plan.
There is no opportunity to make that determination
without investigation, without a pursuit of claims, and
their prosecution or settlement. The reorganization
trustee has full authority to do just that under the direc-
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tion of the Court. And unless he can take those steps,
he ·will not be able to formulate a plan of reorganization
for submission to the Court.
Of course debenture holders or a protective committee
representing them may in some cases take the lead.
But Chapter X was written with the view that such matters should not be left to happenstance. That is why
the reorganization trustee was made the "focal point" for
taking an inventory of assets available to the several
claimants and providing what plan would be fair and
equitable in light of the security of some claimants or
the payment of claims rightfully due them.~
There is, with all respect, no merit in the argument
that, if the reorganization trustee recovers against the indenture trustee on behalf of the debenture holders, the
indenture trustee "·ill be subrogated to the debenture
holders, leaving the total claims affected by the plan
'vholly unchanged.
The complaint against the indenture trustee charges
willful misconduct or gross negligence. What the merits
may be we of course do not know and intimate no opinion. But if true. the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. 15
U. S. C. § 77000 gives no immunity. 3
2
Sec HraringR on H. R. 8046, Senate Judiciary Committe<', 75th
Cong., 2d Sess., 126.
The ab~olute priority rule was applied in a serif'~ of railroad
reorganizations. Sec Ecker "· TT'estem Pac. R. Corp., :ns U. S.
4-t8; Group of Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co., 318 r. S. 523;
Reconstruction Finance Corp. "· Denver & R. G. 11'. R. Co., 328
U. S. 495.
3
While the indrnturr trustee may rel~· on crrtificate~ or opinions
concerning the truth of statements and the correctness of opinions
"in the absence of bad faith" (15 U. S. C. § 77000(a)), it is not
exempt from liability "for its own negligent action, its own negligent
failure to act, or its own wilful misconduct" ( 15 U. S. C. § 77000
(d)), save for errors in judgment made in good faith. Ibid.

('
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We said in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 307, that
"the bankruptcy court in passing on allowance of claims
sits as a court of equity" and we cited the cases showing
that claimants in a fiduciary position may have their
claims either wholly disallowed or subordinated. !d.,.
311, 312. As stated in American Surety Co. v. Bethlehem
Nat. Bank, 314 U. S. 314, 317, while the surety as "a
special kind of secured creditor" it is a right that "can be
availed of only by a surety alert in discharging its
duty . . . and one not guilty of inequitable conduct."
The indellture trustee is not, of course, a surety. It
would have to seek subrogation under the general equitable doctrine, stated as follows by the American Law
Institute. 4
"Where property of one person is used in discharging an obligation owed by another or a lien upon
the property of another, under such circumstances
that the other would be unjustly enriched by the
retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former is
entitled to be subrogated to the position of the
obligee or lien-holder."

It is not imaginable that any court would ever hold
that an indenture trustee, found culpably responsible for
the default on debentures, would be subrogated with re-spect to funds which otherwise would go to innocent
creditors or stockholders on the ground that paying
money to them rather than to it would constitute unjust
enrichment. A person "who invokes the doctrine of
subrogation must come into court with clean hands."
German Bank v. United States, 148 U. S. 573, 581.
I agree with Judge Kaufman and Judge Hays, dissenting below, and would reverse this judgment.
'1

Hc::;tatement of Restitution § 162 (1937).
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